Tuesday, October 7, 2008
 
 
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2008 News Items
   
 
 
2006 News Articles
December 12, 2006
Sidak's Network Neutrality Paper To Appear in Journal of Competition Law and Economics
   
July 13, 2006
Crandall and Sidak Release Report on the Entertainment Software Industry
   
June 14, 2006
Singer Addresses Medical Device Manufacturers
   
June 2, 2006
Eisenach Joins Criterion Economics as Chairman
   
May 4, 2006
Crandall and Litan Release Study Showing Benefits of Video Competition for Local Government Finances and Employment
   
April 14, 2006
Washington Times Quotes Singer on Comcast-Orioles Dispute
   
March 9, 2006
Wall Street Journal Carries Crandall Opinion on AT&T-BellSouth Merger and the State of Antitrust Policy
   
February 9, 2006
Supreme Court of Canada Cites MacAvoy and Sidak in ATCO Decision
 
 

Supreme Court of Canada Cites MacAvoy and Sidak in ATCO Decision

February 9, 2006

On 9 February 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada released a decision in which it ruled that the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board did not have jurisdiction to allocate the proceeds of the sale of public utility assets to consumers (in whole or in part).  Critical to the decision was the conclusion that no power to allocate proceeds had been explicitly conferred on the Board and that none could be said to exist by "necessary implication" because such a power was required for the Board to discharge its public interest mandate. The decision not only puts clear constraints on the "doctrine of jurisdiction by necessary implication" recognized in earlier decisions of the Court; it may also signal a new judicial readiness to closely monitor regulatory action, especially where property rights come into play. In its decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the academic research of Professors Paul MacAvoy and J. Gregory Sidak, founder of Criterion. For example, the Court quoted the professors extensively to distinguish the risks faced by a utility's customers from the risks faced by its shareholders.

The decision appears to significantly constrain the ability of regulatory authorities to resort to the doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessary implication" to supplement the powers expressly conferred upon them. In future, it will be necessary to show, for example, that there are no other means of accomplishing the regulatory objective using express powers. The recent judicial tendency to read regulatory authority broadly (which remains very much in evidence in the decision of the dissenting justices) may be giving way to a different approach where the onus is placed squarely on advocates of regulation to find specific authority for intervention in markets, especially where property rights are in issue.