Internet & Telecommunications

The Fair Division of Surplus from a FRAND License Negotiated in Good Faith, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things (Jonathan M. Barnett & Sean M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2022).

Brief of J. Gregory Sidak and David J. Teece as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee, State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 21-7078, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Mar. 28, 2022).

The Law of n+1, 7 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2021).

Monopoly, Innovation, and Due Process: FTC v. Qualcomm and the Imperative to Destroy, 6 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2020).

An Economic Theory of Censorship Revisited, 5 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2020).

Negotiating FRAND Licenses in Good Faith, 5 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2020).

Capitalism, Socialism, and the Constitution, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 801 (2019).

What Makes FRAND Fair? The Just Price, Contract Formation, and the Division of Surplus from Voluntary Exchange, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2019).

Transition Bonds for Stranded Costs, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2019).

Misconceptions Concerning the Use of Hedonic Prices to Determine FRAND or RAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2019).

Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to Parnos Munyard Regarding Comments on the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Draft Guidelines on the Repeal of Subsection 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (July 19, 2019).

Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties: Epilogue, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2019).

Hedonic Prices for Multicomponent Products, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2019).

Judge Selna’s Errors in TCL v. Ericsson Concerning Apportionment, Nondiscrimination, and Royalties Under the FRAND Contract, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2019).

Letter from Judge Ken Starr to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Concerning Conflict Between the International Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division Over Monopoly and Innovation (Dec. 11, 2018).

Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or the Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2018).

Is Professor Salop Right That Judge Leon Bungled United States v. AT&T?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 249 (2018).

Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials in Support of Appellees and Supporting Affirmance, United States v. AT&T, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Sept. 26, 2018) (No. 18-5214).

Did Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rates Help Entrants Gain Market Share?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2017).

The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2017).

A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 Criterion J. on Innovation 1001 (2016).

Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied?, 68 Florida Law Review 1403 (2016).

What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2016).

Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2016).

Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).

Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 University of Illinois Law Review 1809.

Is Uber Unconstitutional?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 179 (2016).

The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 Baylor Law Review 59 (2016).

Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2016).

Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments (Keynote Address at the 2015 IEEE-SIIT Conference, Oct. 6, 2015).

Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft), Japan Fair Trade Commission (July 28, 2015).

Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Canadian Competition Bureau (July 28, 2015).

Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest, U.S. ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (Remand) (July 20, 2015).

FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 609 (2015).

How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car, World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine 10 (June 2015).

The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).

Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom Benefit Consumers?, 38 World Competition: Law & Economics Review 31 (2015).

Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 San Diego Law Review 619 (2015).

The Fallacy of “Equal Treatment” in Brazil’s Bill of Rights for Internet Users, 8 Revista Direito GV 651 (2012).

What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 663 (2012).

The OECD’s Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications, Competition Policy International Special Issue (June 2012).

Declaration of Economists and Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V (Telcel), Reconsideration Recourse, RA-007-2011, Case File No. DE-37-2006, Comisión Federal de Competencia (United Mexican States) (Oct. 14, 2011).

The Impact of Multisided Markets on the Debate over Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the Internet, 7 Política Económica y Regulatoria en Telecomunicaciones 94 (2011).

Innovation Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery Over the Internet, 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 521 (2010).

Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).

Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 697 (2008).

Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, No. 07-512 (filed Sept. 4, 2008).

Are Regulators Forward-Looking? The Market Price of Copper Versus the Regulated Price of Mandatory Access to Unbundled Local Loops in Telecommunications Networks, 61 Federal Communications Law Journal 199 (2008).

What Is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About?, 1 International Journal of Communications 377 (2007).

Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?, 59 Federal Communications Law Journal 251 (2007).

Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 471 (2007).

Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 387 (2007).

Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators, 6 Review of Network Economics 348 (2007).

Video Games: Serious Business for America’s Economy (2006).

When Does an Optional Tariff Not Lead to a Pareto Improvement? The Ambiguous Effects of Self-Selecting Nonlinear Pricing When Demand Is Interdependent or Firms Do Not Maximize Profit, 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 285 (2006).

A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 349 (2006).

Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 109th Cong. 59-63 (2006) (statement of J. Gregory Sidak).

Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 173 (2005).

Should Regulators Set Rates to Terminate Calls on Mobile Networks?, 21 Yale Journal on Regulation 261 (2004).

Überregulation without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, 57 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2004).

Do States Tax Wireless Services Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand, 24 Virginia Tax Review 249 (2004).

Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?, 3 Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy art. 3 (2004).

European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 2, Technology Evolution and the Internet 517 (2003).

Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries, 2003 Michigan State DCL Law Review 741 (2003).

An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 Supreme Court Economic Review 81 (2003).

Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?, 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 389 (2003).

The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 207 (2003).

Interim Pricing of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland: Epilogue, 4 Journal of Network Industries 119 (2003).

Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 Harvard International Law Journal 317 (2002).

How Can Regulators Set Nonarbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland, 3 Journal of Network Industries 273 (2002).

Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers, 26 Telecommunication Policy 287 (2002).

The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access, 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 953 (2002).

Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 463 (2002).

Why Did the U.S. Telecommunications Industry Collapse?, 28 Infocom Review 17 (2002) (in English and Japanese).

Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale Journal on Regulation 335 (2002).

Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001).

An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2001).

Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 302 (2001).

Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 129 (2001).

Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, 54 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2001).

Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2000).

What Is Wrong with American Telecommunications?, MultiMedia und Recht, 15 (Mar.1999), reprinted in Competition and Regulation in Telecommunications: Examining Germany and America 69 (Kluwer Academic Press 2000).

A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale Law Journal 417 (1999).

A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 Hastings Law Journal 1639 (1999).

Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 Yale Journal on Regulation 117 (1998).

Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 337 (1998).

Network Access Pricing and Deregulation, 6 Industrial & Corporate Change 757 (1997).

Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 New York University Law Review 1068 (1997).

The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Columbia Law Review 1081 (1997).

Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 New York University Law Review 851 (1996).

Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 Southern California Law Review 1203 (1995).

The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 Yale Journal on Regulation 171 (1994).

Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 California Law Review 1209 (1993) (review essay).

The “New Payola” and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services, 10 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 521 (1987).